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butions of men and women, the U.S. labor market is still highly segregated. Looking at occupations within establishments reveals even higher degrees of job segregation (Bielby and Barron 1984) . The persistence of job segregation has come to dominate the discussion of policies to redress disparate labor market outcomes concerning employed men and women. Wage differences between men and women are smaller within narrowly defined occupations than they are across occupations. Both men and women in predominantly female occupations have lower average pay than men and women in predominantly male occupations. As a result, much of the wage differential between men and women is tied to the different employers and occupational labor markets that men and women inhabit and not to disparate treatment within given employers. Blau (1977) finds that men and women are employed in different firms even within an occupation. Groshen (1991) reported that one-half to two-thirds of the pay gap between the sexes in manufacturing and service jobs could be attributed to differences in occupational status. This has led to allegations of market pay discrimination against predominantly female jobs in addition to allegations of access barriers.
Based on this presumption, some have proposed government intervention in the setting of relative pay between male and female jobs. These comparable worth policies have been relegated to the public sector in the United States, but they have been extended (in various guises) to the private sector in other countries, most notably in Australia and the Province of Ontario in Canada. Underlying comparable worth is the notion that as women's labor supply has increased, they have been crowded into the relatively few sectors in which they can compete for jobs. Thus, occupational barriers imposed by discriminating firms have resulted in both occupational segregation and artificially lower pay for female jobs. 1 The presumption of comparable worth is that, at least in the short run, occupational supply behavior of women and men do not respond to changes in relative wages. Without any supply response, these pay policies can raise female compensation in traditionally female jobs and, thus, raise the overall pay of women relative to men.
Other studies have emphasized supply-side explanations for occupational segregation. Some studies have pointed to differences in expected career length or to intermittent employment spells as explaining differences in incentives for men and women to select occupations. If there are different costs associated with time spent out of the labor force (loss of wage growth or lost skills), women may opt for occupations with low exit costs.
2 Other supply-side explanations of the difference in occupational status by sex have centered on presumed difference in tastes for nonpecuniary job attributes between the sexes (Filer 1983) .
If the relative number of men and women in an occupation does vary with supply-side behavior, comparable worth policies aimed at raising compensation to women in traditionally female jobs may have some unexpected consequences. Although there are not comparable estimates for females, there is considerable evidence that male occupational supply elasticities are large.
3 If men are more sensitive than women to occupational wage changes, then men will have an incentive to enter traditionally female jobs if pay for those jobs is increased. Similarly, if pay for traditionally male jobs falls due to these policies, men will move out of these jobs in greater proportions, increasing the proportion of women in traditionally male jobs. Even if women have perfectly inelastic occupational supply curves, elastic male occupational supply curves would suggest that the sex composition of jobs is not invariant to relative wages. Yet studies of the effect of comparable worth on male and female pay implicitly have assumed that the current distribution of men and women across occupations is invariant to changes in relative wages. 4 This study estimates relative male and female wage elasticities to state government jobs using two data sets. One sample includes information on employees in states that have implemented comparable worth pay plans, states using other factor point plans to set pay, and states that have pay systems that are not set by factor points. 5 In addition, we study data on applicants to Iowa state government jobs. We estimate how the relative 2 Polachek (1981) and McDowell (1982) present evidence that there are different costs of interrupted work careers between traditionally male and traditionally female careers. Sandell and Shapiro (1980) found that anticipated labor force attachment affected earnings growth for young women.
3 Freeman (1987a) and Orazem and Mattila (1991) provide estimates of male occupational supply elasticities that are highly elastic. Comparable supply elasticities for women have not been published to date.
4 Sorenson (1990) reviews a large number of studies that measure how the proportion female in an occupation alters occupational pay. The presumption is that raising pay to predominantly female occupations would then reduce pay differences between men and women overall. The potential for men to enter traditionally female jobs is not factored into these projections.
5 A factor point system evaluates the relative value of each job within a pay system by assigning points to each job. These points are based on the levels of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions associated with each job. The summed points generate a hierarchy of jobs that are then mapped into relative pay, usually with some adjustments to take into account market pay. Comparable worth plans differ from traditional factor point plans in that market wages are explicitly excluded from the setting of relative pay. number of female incumbents or applicants responds to changes in market and state government occupational pay.
The concentration on state government labor markets offers many advantages. The most obvious is that state governments have been the focus of most of the effort to implement comparable worth policies. A second advantage is that relative pay across occupations within each state government tends to be fixed across time by the pay plan and does not (necessarily) respond to changing market supply factors (Kim 1989) . This implies that relative government wages tend to be exogenous within each state.
In the next section, we provide a theory of occupational supply of men and women to the public sector. This motivates the empirical strategy outlined in Section III. Section IV summarizes the nature of our two data sets and the estimates of our model, along with implications and discussion of alternative demand-side interpretations. Section V briefly states our major conclusions.
II. Theory
We decompose the choice of whether or not to select a public-sector job into two parts. First, an individual selects an occupation. All employers may participate in this occupational market, but each employer is too small to affect market wages for the occupation. Once an individual selects an occupation in stage 1, the individual opts for either a public-or privatesector job in stage 2. Our empirical work will concentrate on the stage 2 decision, but we will first describe the two stages separately.
A. Stage 1: Occupational Choice
The human capital investment theory of occupational choice presumes that an individual selects an occupation so as to maximize expected utility. Utility depends on the earnings in the occupation and the nonpecuniary returns associated with job-specific amenities or disamenities. Because individuals differ in talents and in tastes, not all individuals will rank occupations similarly in terms of expected utility. As a result, an individual j will select occupation i among N alternatives so as to maximize expected utility U e ij . The form for expected utility is assumed to be
where W ij is individual j's wage in occupation i and Z ij is a vector of occupational amenities and disamenities associated with occupation i. Due to differences in abilities and locations, the W ij and Z ij will vary across individuals. Individual valuation of those wages and amenities will also differ. Consequently, individuals will rank occupations differently.
The variation across individuals in expected utility across N occupa-tions will generate a distribution of I individuals across N occupations such that
where L i is the number of agents supplying labor to occupation i. Differences in U e ij , W ij , and Z ij across the sexes will cause the proportion of men and women to differ across occupations. Males and females may differ in expected earnings or amenities in an occupation, and they may have different relative valuations of these occupational attributes.
Let M i be the number of men and F i be the number of women in occupation i. Women's share of occupation i, S F i , is
where total labor supply to occupation i is L i Å M i / F i . The factors that differ across males and females within an occupation would also be expected to differ across spatially distinct labor markets. As a result, S F i is likely to differ across markets.
B. Stage 2: Public-versus Private-Sector Choice
By their nature as multiproduct producers, state governments employ workers from many different occupational labor markets. Governments must compete for workers against other firms in the occupational labor market. Therefore, compensation for public employees must be such that expected utility from work in the government must equal or exceed that offered by other firms in the same occupational market for enough workers to fill public jobs.
If government jobs were identical in all respects to private-sector jobs, then the occupational distribution of public-sector men and women would be identical to that in the private sector. However, considerable evidence supports the presumption that public-and private-sector jobs are not identical in pecuniary and nonpecuniary attributes. On average, public-sector employees receive higher pay than similarly skilled privatesector workers. The pay gap is largest at the federal level, with more moderate pay advantages for state and local workers (Smith 1977; Freeman 1987b) . These favorable wage gaps are largest for female publicsector workers (Krueger 1988) . In addition, employee benefits and job security appear to be more generous in the public sector (Quinn 1982; Freeman 1987b) . While these nonwage attributes will be very similar for men and women within a given state government pay system, men and women may differ in their tastes for these nonpecuniary job attributes / 9e0e$$ja12
11-12-97 09:42:04 laeca UC: Labor Econ (Blank 1985) . As a result of these gender differences in government pay versus market pay and potential differences in tastes for government job attributes, the relative supply of female and male applicants to a government job may deviate from relative supply to the occupation as a whole. Given the proportion of women in the occupation, S F i , the relative incentive to select public-sector employment depends on public-sector wages, w i , and public-sector amenities, z i . The proportion of women in government occupation i can be characterized by
The overall proportion female S f i should be positively related to s f i since one would expect a larger proportion in the applicant pool and because of gender differences in job-specific skills. If the public sector is small relative to the total occupational labor market, S F i can be treated as exogenous to s f i . However, if the proportion of women in the occupation is altered by public-sector wages and job attributes, then the exogeneity assumption is suspect. In that case, equation (3) can be used to predict S F i so that
or in reduced form,
Our main interest is in establishing how the proportion of females in a public-sector job is affected by public-sector wages. The effect of wages on the proportion of females in public employment is not obvious because men and women may differ in their relative sensitivity to government wages. In equations (4) -(6), the derivative of s f i with respect to w i is
where m i and f i are the number of men and women in government occupation i. Combining terms, we obtain
The relation in (7) 
where
is the wage elasticity of supply to government occupation i for sex j, and s j i is the proportion of occupation i incumbents who are of sex j. Because an increase in w i must increase expected utility from choosing job i, e (8) implies that the coefficient on the public-sector wage will be zero.
The theory suggests that one can determine the relative size of male and female wage elasticities to government employment by estimating a regression equation approximating equations (4) -(6). The most obvious problem with this strategy is that the number of incumbents in a job is a function of both labor demand and labor supply. Therefore, the wage elasticity will reflect both demand and supply effects. However, the concentration on the proportion female in the job rather than the total number of incumbents as the dependent variable makes it possible to sidestep some of these problems. Let l i Å f i / m i be the total number of public-sector positions in job i, where m i is the number of male incumbents and f i is the number of female incumbents. Government labor demand decisions will set the number of positions (l i ). If governments do not discriminate by sex in hiring, the proportion of female incumbents to the total will reflect the proportion of female incumbents in the qualified application pool. In this way, s f i Å f i /l i will reflect the relative incentives of males and females to supply labor to government. In contrast, if governments systematically discriminate against women, the proportion of women in government jobs will reflect demandside tastes for discrimination as well as relative supply-side reactions to wages. We will examine the demand-versus supply-side explanations in the empirical section.
III. Empirical Strategy
Equations (4) - (6) suggest that one can derive an estimate of the relative size of male and female occupational supply elasticities by estimating regressions of the form / 9e0e$$ja12
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and
where e i is an error term and the other variables are defined above. In (9a), the proportion of female incumbents in the market as a whole is assumed to be exogenous to the proportion of female incumbents in state government. If this assumption is invalid, the instrumental SO F i or its reduced form is preferred. As will be shown, the qualitative results for the coefficient on w i are not sensitive to the specification choice.
Equations (9a) - (9c) presume that the starting pay for each job is predetermined. This assumption is quite reasonable, especially when pay is measured in relative terms. Government pay structures tend to be rigid: pay increases are generally implemented across the board. A study of the California merit pay system by Kim (1989) found that relative pay in the 1980s could be predicted with near certainty by relative pay in the 1930s. This institutional rigidity implies that starting wages in the merit system are not altered in response to changes in the sex composition of incumbents in the job. It is, of course, possible that these relative wages were sex-biased when set years ago, but for our purposes, it is only important that they be viewed as predetermined data by workers.
An exception to this argument lies in the implementation of comparable worth pay plans. Since comparable worth states base pay at least partly on proportional female incumbency and because of their recent implementation, predetermination of state relative pay using 1987-88 data may be questionable. Fortunately, we also have information from states that have not implemented comparable worth systems. We test the government pay exogeneity assumption by examining the sensitivity of the parameter estimates when only noncomparable worth states are included. Their pay systems have been in place longer and have no explicit goal to link pay to the proportion of female incumbents.
A second way to remove possible simultaneity between s f i and w i is to use the proportion of female applicants for job vacancies rather than the proportion of female employees as the dependent variable. Because pay is set before jobs are advertised, applicants must be responding to public-sector wages. As we show below, results using a sample of applicants were similar (although not identical) to those using the sample of incumbents.
IV. Data and Results

A. Multistate Analysis
In this section we investigate data on incumbents gathered from a survey of state government personnel departments. After obtaining a / 9e0e$$ja12
11-12-97 09:42:04 laeca UC: Labor Econ complete listing of job titles from a subset of states, we selected 78 job titles that were common to most states, that matched published 1980 Census of Population occupation titles (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983, table 222), and that spanned the range of traditionally male, traditionally female, and mixed jobs such as carpenter, clerk, and registered nurse. The list of jobs by gender composition is included in the appendix. Phone interviews with state personnel professionals indicated that these jobs were also broadly representative of the range of jobs performed in state government. State personnel managers were asked to match the job title to the closest position in their state pay system. Respondents were asked to call for clarifications if they were uncertain about the job title, and titles that were not easily recognized were dropped. For each job, the personnel professional was asked to report the starting pay, the proportion female, and whether the job was covered by a union contract. In addition, information was obtained on whether the state's pay system was a comparable worth pay system, a factor point pay system, or some other pay system. Sixteen states declined to participate or did not have consistent statewide pay systems. Another 14 had information on pay and union status but did not have information on female incumbents by job classification. The remaining 20 states supplied the necessary information. These states are listed in table 1 along with information on their pay system and public-sector unionization. Pooling across the 20 states, we had complete information on 1,393 state jobs, an average of almost 70 job titles per state pay system. The information provided was from state pay systems in 1987 or 1988.
Seven of the 20 state systems are not covered by collective-bargaining agreements, but workers in states with comparable worth systems are more likely to be covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The information in table 1 also shows that in 16 of the 20 states, the proportion of women incumbents in state government is higher than their relative proportion in the state labor market as a whole. Several states, including Connecticut, Delaware, Nevada, North Carolina, and Virginia, have much higher levels of female state government incumbency than in the same occupations in the state as a whole. The measures of proportion female and union coverage are self-explanatory. The measure of state occupation pay ( w) requires further comment. Differences in cost-of-living, benefits, job conditions, local amenities, or other factors may alter the relative attractiveness of state government jobs across states. To control for variation in these unmeasured compensating differentials, we normalize pay in state job i relative to an ''average'' pay rate computed for each state. There were eight occupations that were common to all states for which we had pay information. 7 An average base was computed across these eight occupations by state using
This measure, together with a set of state dummy variables, removes the biases associated with interstate compensating differentials. The use of publicly known, institutional pay plans with clear entry wage rates implies that males and females will receive the same wage rate. Nondiscrimination policies and public scrutiny assured this within the public sector in the late 1980s. As Blau (1977) and Groshen (1991) imply, private-sector wages may differ by gender within an occupation because of gender segregation and wage differentials between firms. In an attempt to control for this, we compute the ratio of female-to-male earnings within the state (W F /W M ), which becomes an additional control variable. Table 2 contains definitions and sample statistics of the variables used in the analysis of the 20-state incumbent data set. The sample statistics are reported for all jobs and for predominantly male and predominantly female jobs. Male jobs were defined (following much of the literature) as jobs in which, when averaged across all 20 state governments, more than 75% of all incumbents were male. These represent about 30% of all jobs in the sample. Similarly, female jobs were defined as jobs in which more than 75% of the incumbents are female. Twenty-six percent of jobs in the sample were predominantly female, leaving 44% of the jobs implicitly defined as mixed. The average male-dominated job was 90% male, and the average female-dominated job was 88% female.
The measure of relative female status in each occupation in the state as a whole comes from the 1980 Census of Population data on year-round full-time workers in detailed occupations. The measure is based on the number of men and women in the state whose occupation most closely matches the job title in the state government. The 1980 census was used to reduce the likelihood that S ij and s ij were simultaneously determined.
A comparison of the proportion female in state government jobs and the proportion female in the state reveals considerable consistency. Just over half of the state government employees in these occupations are female, whereas 46% of the workers in these occupations in the state as a whole are women. In both traditionally male and traditionally female occupations, the proportion female in state government jobs is about 2% higher than the proportion female in the state as a whole.
As discussed above, S F i , the proportion of women in the occupation as a whole may be endogenous if the public sector hires a large proportion of the relevant occupational supply. Following equation (3), a vector of instruments is used for S F i . One of the variables is (W F /W M ), the annual income of full-time women relative to full-time men in the occupation as a whole. The other instruments are measures of overall occupational attributes, Z i , including average occupational pay, W, required previous job experience, required ability in reading, mathematics and logic, required strength, and estimates of hourly benefits in the occupation. The required experience, ability, and strength measures come from the Dic-/ 9e0e$$ja12
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8 All regressions include the unionization variable and state dummy variables as elements of the vector z i .
We interact government starting pay ( w) with dummy variables for male-and female-dominated jobs. This allows inferences to be drawn on how wage policies aimed at raising relative pay for female-dominated jobs will affect the sex composition of state jobs. The coefficient on (uninteracted) w i represents the response of the proportion of women incumbents to changes in wages in mixed gender jobs. These coefficients are always positive, indicating that women are more sensitive to state government pay in mixed-gender jobs than are men. All of the coefficients on government wages interacted with the female-dominated job dummy variable are positive and significant. The implication is that women's labor supply to predominantly female jobs is relatively more elastic than their supply to mixed jobs. The total effect (determined by adding the coefficients on w and w * Female Job) is positive as well. The reverse is true for predominantly male state jobs. The sum of coefficients on w and w * Male Job are negative, indicating that men have higher elasticities of supply to predominantly male jobs than do women.
These results suggest that a policy to raise relative pay for predominantly female public jobs would raise the proportion of women in female dominated and mixed jobs. If, as is likely, such increases for predominantly female jobs come at the expense of raises in traditionally male jobs, then relative wages in the latter jobs will drop. Because women have lower supply elasticities in male-dominated jobs, the proportion of women in traditionally male jobs will also increase as relatively more males exit these jobs. Therefore, these results suggest that a comparable worth pay policy would tend to raise the proportion of women employed in both female-dominated and male-dominated state government jobs.
Because hiring policies in government are typically based on formal tests and civil service procedures across all occupations, we minimize the likelihood that our results are due to discriminatory hiring policies. Equally important, government hiring in the 1980s was subject to much public scrutiny and political pressure to avoid discrimination. If the public sector has been less discriminatory than private-sector firms in recent 8 Because of the potential massing of observations on the dependent variable at zero and at one, we also estimated these equations (and those in table 7) using a Tobit specification with upper and lower bounds. None of the findings changed. Examination of the error terms indicated that the least squares specification was less subject to heteroskedastic errors than was the Tobit specification. Standard errors were corrected for heteroskedasticity, using White's (1980) years, it is less likely that our results are attributable to employer hiring discrimination.
However, if some state employers have tastes for discrimination for or against women, the estimates in table 3 will reflect demand as well as supply-side decisions. Given voluntary enactment, comparable worth states would be least likely to have tastes for discrimination against women and might even discriminate against men. This is especially true since our data set was collected after comparable worth had been implemented in these states. Conversely, the noncomparable worth states would be more likely to have discriminatory tastes against women. To / 9e0e$$ja12
11-12-97 09:42:04 laeca UC: Labor Econ NOTE.-All estimates are based on the two-stage parameter estimates in tables 3, 4, and 6. In pt. B, the 11% increase in relative pay for predominantly female jobs assumes a 6.4% increase in female jobs and a 4.2% decrease in other jobs, leaving average government wages unchanged. examine these hypotheses, equations (9a) -(9c) were estimated separately for comparable worth states, factor point states, and non-factor-point states. Non-comparable-worth states were dichotomized into the two latter groups given the possibility that nonfactor point states might have more flexibility to discriminate. The results, reported in table 4, are remarkably consistent across subsamples. If these results are due to demandside tastes for discrimination, then these tastes are so pervasive as to be similar in the most proactive and traditional states.
To make these results easier to examine, implied differences in publicsector wage elasticities across the sexes are reported in table 5, evaluated at sample means. Because the results are similar across specifications, we report only those using coefficients from estimates of (9b). The computation is performed by transforming equation (8) 
where the derivative is the appropriate coefficient from tables 3 and 4. The difference in elasticities reported in table 5 tell a consistent story across all pay plans. Women are more sensitive to changes in publicsector pay for mixed and female dominated jobs. The gap between wage / 9e0e$$ja12
11-12-97 09:42:04 laeca UC: Labor Econ elasticities is largest in the female-dominated jobs. In contrast, men have much higher wage elasticities in traditionally male jobs. The differences between male and female wage elasticities are larger in states using pay plans that are not based on factor points, perhaps indicating demand-side tastes that reinforce supply-side differences.
If the relative elasticities in table 5 are to be explained by discriminatory selective hiring by sex, then it must be that state governments give preferential treatment to hiring males as occupational entry-level wages rise in predominantly male jobs. At the same time, state governments would have to give preferential treatment to hiring females as the occupational entry-level wage rises in mixed and female dominated jobs. Since none of the positions are supervisory, and all are entry-level positions filled from outside hires, the pattern cannot be explained by preferential promotions within the state job hierarchy. While it is possible that states engage systematically in selective preferential hiring policies that vary by entrylevel wage and gender composition of the job, the supply-side story seems more plausible. That is, although employers may prefer males as the wage rises in male dominated jobs, it seems unlikely that they would also prefer females as the wage rises in mixed and female-dominated jobs.
B. Iowa Applications Analysis
To better distinguish supply decisions from demand decisions, it is preferable to use measures of notional supply to state governments, rather than measures of incumbents already employed. Such data were available for 148 jobs in the Iowa state government for the years 1986 ( 1 2 year), 1987-88, 1989-90, and 1990-91 . Only entry-level occupations were selected to avoid problems associated with applications to jobs for which prior state experience was a prerequisite.
The Iowa applications data includes only those deemed qualified for the job. Qualifications are determined by education, past experience, licensure, or performance on exams as dictated by the particular requirements of each job. Applications are only taken when openings exist. For some jobs, with many incumbents and high turnover, applications are taken continuously throughout the year. For other jobs, applications may only be taken for a month or two. Therefore, the use of relative numbers of applicants by gender, rather than the absolute number of applicants, immediately controls for the length of time that applications were being accepted. Both males and females have equal opportunity to apply, and the relative number of women in each applicant pool represents the relative supply of women to state government.
The regressors include those used in the multistate analysis of incumbents plus a few other variables that were thought to affect the marginal utility of accepting state employment. The state government wage is measured as the starting wage in the job as taken from state pay plans for / 9e0e$$ja12
11-12-97 09:42:04 laeca UC: Labor Econ the relevant years. The market wage was computed as the average wage from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) tapes (U.S. Bureau of the Census, various years) of the occupation most closely tied to the state occupation for the 3 years preceding the application year. The applications data better matched the more detailed CPS occupational titles as opposed to the more broadly defined published census tables used for the multistate sample. The comparison was made by using the Iowa Department of Personnel's (1986) ''Minimum Qualifications Guide'' to identify occupations or skills deemed qualifying for entry into the state job. Regional wages were used for jobs in which local markets were presumed to be most relevant. National averages were used for jobs that are primarily highly skilled and for which national recruitment was presumed to occur. The CPS tapes also provided information on the relative number of women and men in the occupation.
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These variables were supplemented by several other measures of the attractiveness of the job. The first is the number of openings in the job during the year. This was derived from the December payroll tapes as the number of incumbents in each job with less than 1 year of experience with the state. The potential for advancement was measured by the number of pay grades one could advance from the entry job before becoming a supervisor. This was constructed using the Iowa ''Minimum Qualifications Guide,'' which provided information on jobs for which experience in the entry job would be considered qualifying for internal promotion. That source also provided information on the educational and experience requirements of the job.
The sample statistics for these variables are reported in table 6. Maleand female-dominated jobs were again defined to be those with more than 75% incumbents of that sex. The first finding from table 6 is that applicants do not match the current sex composition of the job. While women make up 7% of the incumbents (as computed from Iowa payroll tapes) in the male jobs, they make up over 20% of the qualified applicants to those jobs. Similarly, men make up 23% of the qualified applicants to female jobs, whereas current incumbents are only 7% male. This would suggest the potential for large changes in the sex composition of these jobs in the future. It also suggests that historical labor supply decisions (as reflected by those already employed) may differ from labor supply decisions made by current job entrants. The sample statistics for the Iowa job attributes are reported in table 6. Starting wages in predominantly female-dominated jobs in Iowa State government are lower than starting wages in predominantly male jobs. Pay in mixed jobs is lower than that in predominantly male jobs but higher than that in predominantly female jobs. Male government jobs require slightly higher levels of education and prior experience than do female jobs. The relative market gap in education and experience requirements between male and female jobs is larger, based on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor 1977) measures for these jobs. Male government jobs provide less opportunity for pay growth and have fewer openings per year than do female jobs. The former is contrary to the general pattern (Blau 1977, p. 100) and may reflect the greater number of female-dominated medical occupations (nurses, therapists, etc.) found in state government.
The estimates of equations (9a) -(9c) using the sample of qualified applicants in Iowa state government are reported in table 7. The results for predominantly male and female jobs are very consistent with those obtained from use of the multistate data set on incumbents. Female relative wage elasticities are greatest for predominantly female jobs and smallest in predominantly male jobs, as in the sample of incumbents. For mixed jobs, female supply is less elastic or equally elastic compared to men, in contrast to the larger female elasticities obtained for mixed jobs in the sample of incumbents.
The difference in male-and female-wage elasticities are reported in row 5 of table 5. For male-dominated jobs, the estimates are similar to those in the incumbents sample. Males are much more sensitive than women to government wages in traditionally male jobs. For traditionally female jobs, women still have larger wage elasticities relative to men. The gap is much smaller than in the earlier estimates but is statistically significant. Men now have more elastic supply to mixed jobs, but the difference is only marginally significant. In both data sets, the female wage elasticity increases relative to the male elasticity as the analysis moves from maledominated to mixed to female-dominated jobs.
The larger differences in male and female wage elasticities in the incumbents sample versus the applicants sample is consistent with the presumption that male and female labor supply decisions are becoming more similar over time. Since incumbents would be expected to be from older cohorts on average than are job seekers, one would expect smaller differences in wage elasticities in the applicants sample.
The Iowa applications sample offers a further check on whether the proportion of female incumbents by job reflects largely supply-side decisions. Using the same 148 occupations, we regressed the proportion female among new hires on the proportion female in the applicant pool using data averaged over the available years. The null hypothesis / 9e0e$$ja12
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/ 9e0e$$ja12 11-12-97 09:42:04 laeca UC: Labor Econ A few other results are worth noting. Required strength and experience and benefit levels in the market lower the proportion of women among incumbents and applicants. Educational skills are not statistically significant in the applications data estimates, but the signs are consistent with the incumbents sample estimates. Relative earnings of men and women in the overall occupation also did not have a significant effect on the proportion of women among incumbents or applicants.
C. Simulations Sorenson (1987) reported that comparable worth wage adjustments increased relative pay for female jobs by 11%. To show how changes in relative pay affect the relative number of women in state jobs, we used the estimates in tables 3, 4, and 7 to predict the proportion female in government jobs if pay for female jobs relative to other jobs increased by 11%, holding average wages in state government fixed. 10 This was accomplished by raising wages for predominantly female jobs by 6.4% and lowering wages for other jobs by 4.2%. While this exercise allows us to isolate the effects of relative pay on supply, holding fixed the ratio of overall government to private-sector pay, it also has some basis in reality. Governmental budget constraints imply that real pay increases for some jobs may require real pay reductions in others, say by holding pay increases below the rate of inflation.
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The largest supply response to a comparable worth policy, as shown in the bottom half of table 5, are in predominantly male jobs. The proportion of female incumbents in male jobs is predicted to increase by 10.1%, while the proportion of female applicants rises by 9.4%. The reason is that men leave government more readily when government wages fall because of the higher male wage elasticity in predominantly male jobs. Women's employment share also rises in predominantly female jobs, albeit by a much smaller percentage than the increase in male jobs. For mixed jobs, the simulated responses imply a small reduction in women's share of employment but a small increase in their share of applicants. Overall, this simulated comparable worth policy raised the proportion of women among incumbents by 3.25% and the proportion of women applicants to state government by 3.42%. 12 10 The simulated proportion female does not require that only supply-side factors explain the wage elasticities. The simulations will reflect both demand and supply-side factors if discriminatory tastes affect the wages elasticities in table 5. 11 See Orazem and Mattila (1990) for a discussion of these issues. 12 These simulated comparable worth effects are partially consistent with the pattern of female incumbency we observe in the multistate sample. The relative supply elasticities estimated from the Iowa sample suggest that lowering relative pay for male and mixed dominated jobs would raise the proportion female in / 9e0e$$ja12
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V. Conclusions
Using two different data sets, we find strong evidence that the proportion of women in state government jobs is affected by relative occupational pay. In particular, our findings suggest that women have higher supply elasticities in predominantly female jobs and men have larger supply elasticities in male jobs. While our findings might be explained by employment discrimination in favor of women in higherpaid female jobs and in favor of men in higher-paid male jobs, it is more likely that these results are attributable to different public-sector supply elasticities between men and women. The supply-side interpretation is supported by similar findings in a sample of job applicants and evidence supporting the hypothesis of sex-blind hiring from application pools.
The findings suggest that policies that alter relative pay in state government will alter the gender composition of state jobs. In particular, comparable worth policies that raise relative pay in traditionally female jobs while lowering relative pay in traditionally male jobs will raise the proportion of females in male-dominated and female-dominated jobs and will tend to increase the female share of public-sector jobs more generally. The implication is that supply-side responses by themselves need not prevent comparable worth pay adjustments from raising total female compensation. This conclusion must be qualified by noting the potentially offsetting decline in female compensation as women gain an increasing proportion of male-dominated jobs that suffer falling real wages. male jobs and lower the proportion female in mixed jobs. The prediction is consistent with the multistate, cross-sectional pattern of female incumbency as shown in table 8. However, raising pay in the female-dominated jobs should raise the proportion female in comparable worth states, in contradiction to the observed cross-sectional pattern. It should be emphasized that a better test would be to observe female incumbency longitudinally as relative pay is changed within a state, but that is not possible with the current data.
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